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The Economic Rationale Behind the Social Business Model: 
A Research Agenda 
 





This article’s purpose is to set out the economic rationale that underpins social businesses, 
engaging in a research agenda’s conceptual development on hybrid firm ecosystems. A 
different form of business is needed to prevent dividend-distributing companies from 
abusing the market power allowed by barriers that keep competitors away at the expense of 
the poor. Thus, bottom-up development strategies have limits if solely based on dividend-
distributing companies. An alternative is offered by social businesses, but these are difficult 
to theorise within the constraints of Pareto optimality. In exploring alternatives to the latter, 
this article posits that, despite shortcomings, there are neoclassical contributions that provide 
a basis for researching social businesses, which can be understood and modelled as 
companies maximising worst-off customers’ well-being. 
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This article is the result of an effort to understand how social business fits into today’s 
economic science. While economic science generally endeavours to understand how for-
profit, dividend-distributing companies, as well as the public sector and donative non-profits, 
drive the allocation of resources in a market economy, this article asks to what extent the 
economic science of today can also serve for researching non-loss, non-dividend companies 
dedicated to the achievement of social goals, also known as social businesses. It is submitted 
that the future of a research agenda on social businesses lies in, first, shedding light on how 
to increase capital investment in social businesses while protecting the non-dividend 
constraint; second, better understanding the governance of social businesses and how the 
non-dividend constraint may prevent possible deviations from the social business’s aim or 
objective function; and third, theorising possible new equilibria which depart from the 
maximisation of value capture on a financially sustainable basis. 
 
Our enquiry starts by exploring some fundamental disagreements concerning bottom-up 
strategies of development, highlighting the limits that for-profits and, in particular, 
multinational corporations (MNCs) have when conceived as the most important drivers of 
economic development. Next we explore the limits of Pareto optimality in theorising hybrid 
firm ecosystems, which is where firms like social businesses actually operate. These are 
‘ahead’ of theory and we point out some shortcomings of Pareto optimality when making 
room for this new research agenda. Neoclassical economics is not, however, totally barren in 
terms of understanding a social business, and we show how it can be productively put at the 
service of this research. To close, we suggest some lines of enquiry that can contribute to 
harnessing a new kind of capitalism, one that better serves humanity’s most pressing needs. 
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BOTTOM-UP APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT 
 
Bottom-up approaches to development are in high demand. The idea that people living on 
less than $2.50 a day can capitalise on economic opportunities to overcome their dire 
situation has gained currency in the last few decades. But however promising this might be, 
there is little consensus over the means best suited to attain the goal of poverty alleviation. 
Although a common feature of this research is the recognition that poverty is too complex a 
problem to be dealt with by the state alone, those advocating bottom-up approaches lack 
unanimity. At the heart of their disagreement lies the array of alternatives offered by the 
private sector, which – it must be remembered – does not rely only on profit motives. A 
social business, for instance, is a new form of commercial venture that lies somewhere 
between for-profit and philanthropy. Challenging the conventional wisdom of efficiency, 
businesses of this kind forgo dividend distribution – like charities or traditional philanthropic 
organisations – but retain the financial sustainability principle of conventional for-profit 
firms (Yunus & Weber, 2007, 2010). 
 
However, some believe that the profit-maximising firm is the most useful mechanism to 
power bottom-up development. For-profits, MNCs in particular, are the best tools to unlock 
the wealth of developing economies, so the argument goes. This involves tapping into 
unexplored economic opportunities in unhampered market economies (e.g. Akula, 2008; 
Fitch & Sorensen, 2007; Hahn, 2008; Kistruck, Sutter & Smith, 2013; Ragan, Chu & 
Petkoski, 2011; Seelos & Mair, 2007; Webb, Kistruck, Ireland & Ketchen, 2010). At a time 
when MNCs face saturated markets at home, Seelos and Mair (2007) and Webb et al. (2010) 
consider MNC-NGO partnerships as a way of reducing the transaction costs of building 
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access to developing markets. At close quarters, Akula (2008) appraises the ability of for-
profits to scale up business capacity in developing economies. The role played by public 
funds in helping businesses to profit in developing economies has been considered by Fitch 
and Sorensen (2007), while the protection of human rights when developing country 
governments fail in this area is explored by Hahn (2008). Kistruck et al. (2013) have also 
considered the use of identity-based mechanisms to increase sales in developing economies 
when agency costs are high, and Ragan et al. (2011) studied how the poor act as consumers, 
co-producers and clients. 
 
Congruent with this literature, Garrette and Karnani (2010) maintain that a departure from 
shareholder wealth creation along the lines of a social business will jeopardise the 
achievement of scale which only free-market equity funding enables. Because investors in 
social businesses act as philanthropists, forgoing dividends (which are instead ploughed back 
into the business), social businesses are doomed to remain under-funded. In a similar vein, 
Kickul, Terjesen, Bacq and Griffiths (2012) stress the difficulty of social business 
governance in the absence of dividend distribution; according to them, the latter serves to 
reward superior performance. Also, Dees and Anderson (2003) warn against ploughing 
profits back, linking this practice to a cultural bias against profits. 
 
It is important to emphasise that we have nothing against appropriating profits per se, as long 
as it takes place in a scenario that does not curtail the poor’s freedom to choose. What seems 
to be missing in these accounts of the for-profit approach to bottom-up development is the 
fact that, since the market structure of developing economies tends to favour chronic 
supernormal profits that serve well economic elites rather than the population at large – 
termed oligarchic capitalism by Baumol, Litan and Schramm (2007) or crony capitalism by 
Agafonow, A., & Donaldson, C. 2015. The Economic Rationale Behind the Social Business Model: A 




Haber (2002) – unhampered profit-making tends to worsen the dire conditions of the poor 
because, simply, they hardly have access to a wide array of consumption/production 
alternatives (Donaldson, Baker, Cheater, Gillespie, McHugh & Sinclair, 2011). It was 
exactly this that inspired the creation of the Grameen Bank, aimed at breaking into the 
financial market of the poor who were at the mercy of loan sharks (Yunus, 1998, 2007a, 
2007b; Yunus, Moingeon & Lehmann-Ortega, 2010). So, in a sense we could say that too 
much profit-making in non-competitive markets is detrimental to capitalism. 
 
A corollary of this is that there are other forms of private enterprises that can contribute to 
enriching a market economy’s business ecosystem. These include the well-known non-profit 
organisations as well as cooperatives, but we are particularly interested in what a new kind 
of hybrid private firm, i.e. a social business, can offer in the context of a market economy. 
Since hybrid firms are being launched and run all over the world (consider, for instance, B-
corporations, low-profit limited liability companies or L3Cs, and social enterprises), it seems 
that practice runs ahead of economic and management theory. Despite the anti-system 
critiques to mainstream economists’ reluctance to conceive alternatives to capitalism, if 
market-based hybrid firms have any future, economics and management science may offer 
after all room for more creative thinking that, in addition to harnessing more sustainable 
business ecosystems, offer a basis for researching these new hybrid firms. Thus, the first 
proposition follows: 
 
Proposition 1: If unhampered profit-making is related to the poor’s freedom to choose, then, 
in the presence of market barriers, for-profits are likely to abuse market power reducing the 
poor’s consumption and production alternatives. 
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PARETO OPTIMALITY AND HYBRID FIRM ECOSYSTEMS 
 
Figure 1 helps to illustrate the crossroads at which the current capitalist system stands. We 
are no longer part of the twentieth-century transition from capitalism to command 
economies. However superior market economies are to command economies, there is room 
for improvement in the current capitalist system. The question is whether such a change is 




The dotted-line hill shape in Figure 1 topped off with point 1 represents the current status 
quo, defined by person B’s maximum well-being given the level of well-being obtained by 
person A. The distribution of well-being, whatever the metric used to measure it, is evidently 
extremely unequal. In order to conceive a transition to a different scenario, one must 
determine the mechanism by which collective decisions are made regarding choice of 
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direction. Twentieth-century economists followed Vilfredo Pareto in relying mostly on the 
market as the instrument of collective choice, although we know that people use other 
methods such as voting and consensus-building (i.e. dialogue and pacts) in parallel, however 
imperfect they might be. Pareto assumed further that no person would agree to a social 
change that implied a lowering of her position in the status quo. Thus, for a change to be 
feasible under these conditions, Pareto postulated what became known as Pareto optimality 
– that is, a departure from the status quo is possible only if at least one person’s well-being 
can be improved without detriment to any other person’s. If such a change were possible 
only at the expense of at least someone in society (let us say a king in a nineteenth-century 
European absolute monarchy), we would be already in the best possible scenario and, 
therefore, no reason for change would exist (Pareto, 1971, p. 261). A dismal outlook for 
human rights and democracy. 
 
Thus, in graphical terms, Pareto optimality is compatible with a limited array of possibilities 
falling within the 90 degrees angle to the north-east of point 1. If we limit ourselves solely to 
Pareto optimal options, improvements to the current situation would only be possible by 
following the for-profit approach to bottom-up development sketched above, represented in 
Figure 1 by the segmented hill topped off with point 2. Given the structural problems 
associated with oligarchic or crony capitalism, any improvement to the current situation runs 
the risk of being only marginal for the worst-off – represented by person B on the horizontal 
axis, whose well-being in point 2 improved slightly compared to point 1. Because of the 
market barriers that get in the way of the poor’s freedom to choose, most of the benefits run 
the risk of being captured by the wealthy – represented by person A on the vertical axis.1 
																																								 																				
1 In the twentieth century the Kaldor–Hicks efficiency criterion was proposed to tackle the 
inherent immobilism of Pareto optimality. Thus, progress could be compatible with the latter 
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Unfortunately, Pareto optimality rules out scenarios involving more equitable profiting from 
economic opportunities in a business ecosystem where new hybrid firms such as social busi-
nesses could thrive in the presence of for-profits. Such a scenario is represented by the solid-
line hill topped off with point 3, next to the long-dash-dot-line representing equal distribu-
tion of well-being. This barrenness of Pareto economics is due to the normative indetermi-
nateness of efficiency (Rawls, 1999), which prevents economists from comparing the state of 
affairs represented by point 3 with that of points 1 and 2. The intersections of the solid-line 
hill with the dotted and segmented-line hills, marked with Xs, highlight the limitations of 
restricting the permissible methods of collective choice to certain market exchanges, because 
the unrealistic assumptions of Pareto optimality rules out what is actually already emerging. 
It also shuts the door to the study of what could be a promising new state of economic affairs 
marked by a hybrid firm ecosystem. 
 
Transition to a hybrid firm ecosystem being inconceivable in mainstream economics does 
not necessarily mean that a radically new economic science must be built from scratch. 
During the second half of the twentieth century, promising optimality rules that rival 
Pareto’s have been developed – John Rawls’s difference principle and Amartya Sen’s 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																										
if people made better off compensate the worse-off in the new state of economic affairs. 
Then, Tibor Scitovsky detected a paradox in the Kaldor–Hicks criterion, consisting in the 
worse-off compensating the better-off in order to return to the initial situation. This paradox 
highlighted the need to achieve a clear aggregate benefit that overtakes the relative 
advantage of returning to the initial situation. In practice, because these theories are in the 
realm of utility metrics, or psychophysical units of welfare, they remained impractical for 
policy-making purposes.	
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capability framework, among others. However, their suitability for social businesses is not a 
matter we shall address here. What we do want to show is that there are more promising 
neoclassical contributions that lie at a less abstract level than Pareto optimality, and that they 
may constitute the basis for researching social businesses. Thus, we submit our second 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: If Pareto optimality is related to a collective choice criterion that grants 
absolute priority to any one person’s well-being, then social change will continue to ignore 
the worst-off in society and alternative forms of capitalism will remain beyond 
consideration. 
 
THE SOCIAL BUSINESS MODEL2 
 
The conventional view holds that a for-profit enterprise operates until the difference between 
total revenue and total cost is maximised, that is until the marginal cost of production equals 
the marginal revenue, hence maximising profits. Thus, firms engage in competition, 
attempting to outperform one another, and resources are allocated in response to the most 
urgent demands able to purchase at a given price. According to an early, widely known 
formulation, ‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest’ (Smith, 1904, p. 16). As a 
result, a for-profit enterprise could be defined as a non-loss, dividend-distributing company 
dedicated entirely to maximising shareowners’ wealth. 
 
																																								 																				
2 This section mainly draws from Agafonow (2013). 
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The evolution of the theory of the firm offers a clear-cut understanding of dividend-
distributing companies based on the limiting parameters contained in the above-mentioned 
definition – that is, the costs, the revenues, and the motives that drive such an enterprise. 
Without recourse to a social welfare function assumed in a collective choice mechanism of 
doubtful legitimacy, namely Pareto optimality, a working definition of a dividend-
distributing company finds expression in concrete phenomena present in market economies. 
Figure 2 puts these building blocks together into a coherent picture, with the Average Total 
Cost curve (ATC) located in the lower left-hand diagram as the lower limiting frontier of the 
operation of a firm. In other words, for a firm to be viable it must at least operate along the 
ATC curve, covering total costs, with the penalty of going bankrupt if it does not. Let us 
remember though that this is a dividend-distributing company, which means that its aim is 
given by the upper limiting frontier of the Marginal Cost curve (MC). That is to say, 
shareowners are served well whenever the firm reaches the intersection between the price 
given by the horizontal segmented line (or marginal revenue) and the MC curve3. Note that 
this coincides with the maximum possible difference between total costs and total revenues – 
namely profits – in the upper left-side part of Figure 2. 
 
The million-dollar question is whether this can serve as the bedrock for researching social 
businesses or does it slam the door on scientific enquiry related to hybrid firm ecosystems. 
Let us remember that a social business is a non-loss, non-dividend company dedicated to 
achieving a social goal (Yunus & Weber, 2007, 2010). The interesting thing about this 
																																								 																				
3 Contrary to textbooks’ conventional wisdom, the upward sloping MC curve rules out a 
perfectly competitive firm’s everywhere-linear-homogeneous production function (Boland, 
1992). Thus, Figure 2 illustrates a firm with a degree of market power made possible by 
quasi-rents (Townsend, 1995). 
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definition is that in addition to departing from a conventional for-profit firm’s definition, it 
adheres to the limiting parameters which characterise a market economy – namely, costs and 
revenues, and the motives that instead drive this kind of business: that is, it describes a 




Because a social business is not an attempt to pull a stunt that would risk valuable capital, it 
takes very seriously the lower limiting frontier of the firm’s operation illustrated by the ATC 
curve located at the bottom right-hand side of Figure 2. That is, a social business is a non-
loss company that must cover its operating costs out of a commercial activity that directly 
targets a vulnerable population – not just the commercial arm of a charitable organisation set 
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up to channel resources elsewhere. Our readers must now be wondering how this is different 
from a dividend-distributing company and to what extent, by charging a price to a vulnerable 
population, social businesses could drift away from their social mission. After all, we are 
talking about worst-off people who have a hard time affording things. 
 
The answer lies in the non-dividend aspect of social businesses. If a dividend-distributing 
company’s aim is represented by the upper limiting frontier of the MC curve – as pointed out 
above – we must think about how the non-dividend aspect of social businesses finds 
expression within the general limiting parameters given by such an enterprise’s cost 
structure. Since profit margins – made possible by operating until the price or marginal 
revenue matches the MC curve, as at point 2 in the bottom right-hand side of Figure 2 – are 
not meant to be captured by shareowners but ploughed back into the social business, 
something different happens. 
 
The right-hand side of Figure 2 illustrates these different consequences. By ploughing back 
profit margins a social business is able to produce as much output as Omax on the horizontal 
axis given the same price. Note that to understand this pricing strategy the relevant cost 
curve is the ATC curve intersected at point 1 starred, not the MC curve as in dividend-
distributing companies. In fact, for the latter to be able to produce as much as social 
businesses, they would have to charge a price equivalent to 1’ in the MC curve to achieve the 
goal of profit maximisation. One could also say that for a social business to produce as much 
as a dividend-distributing company, i.e. Omin on the horizontal axis, it would suffice to 
charge a price equivalent to the intersection of the dashed vertical line arising from Omin 
and the ATC curve, instead of the higher price at point 2 that intersects the MC curve 
(Agafonow, 2013). Although this economic model has existed during a while, it was first 
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linked to a form of non-divided constraint by Enke (1945) and Newhouse (1970). Later it 
would become a standard proposition in the economics of non-profit organisations (see 
James and Rose-Ackerman 2013; Young and Steinberg 1995). 
 
Some may rush to put forward that the social business model is sheer inefficient. Is not the 
MC higher than the MR after all? (Note that MC > MR in the lower part, right-hand side of 
Figure 2). Critics must bear in mind that efficiency is related to an ‘objective function’ which 
in for-profits is about appropriating dividends. The idea that MC must equal MR serves a 
clear goal, i.e. turning the maximum difference between costs and revenues for shareowners’ 
sake. If profits are going to be ploughed back into the business as in a social business, MC > 
MR is the only logical outcome. Moreover, if social businesses are not supposed to distribute 
profits, stopping where the difference between costs and revenues is at its maximum would 
be to hoard profits for nothing, a waste of resources. To what extent this pricing strategy runs 
against allocative efficiency and is still desirable under circumstances begged by the social 
business’s mission, is an issue open to debate. 
 
This pricing strategy makes a social business a ‘poor friendly’ company dedicated to 
maximising worst-off customers’ well-being, because profit margins can be totally devoted 
to the enhancement of the quantity-quality mix of the company’s output (Donaldson et al., 
2011). Even the most responsible dividend-distributing company will have to sacrifice some 
quantity and/or quality for the sake of shareowners’ wealth. But this pricing strategy applied 
to the production of goods or services of particular importance to the poor, makes a social 
business a powerful tool for the poor’s enhancement. In a sense, we could say that social 
businesses ‘satisfice on value capture’ (Santos, 2012), in that turning a profit margin is 
instrumental in allowing further investment in the quantity-quality mix rather than 
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maximising shareowners’ wealth, but the term ‘satisficing’ can be misleading in this context 
(Agafonow, 2014a). It might be more appropriate to understand a social business as 
‘maximising on value devolution’, which is the ability of non-dividend firms to plough 
profits back until the difference between costs and revenues disappears (Agafonow, 2014b), 
something that for-profits avoid. As a result, a final proposition follows: 
 
Proposition 3: If the social business model is related to watching out for both a budget 
constraint and a non-divided constraint, then a social business operates effectively until the 
marginal revenue equals the average total cost when the output is maximised. 
 
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE LINES OF ENQUIRY 
 
Bottom-up development strategies are limited if solely based on dividend-distributing 
companies. High entry and exit barriers in developing economies de facto curtail the poor’s 
freedom to choose because the resulting market structure favours local oligarchies at the 
expense of the population at large. If dividend-distributing companies make it into 
developing economies there is no reason to believe that they are not going to exploit the 
opportunities to turn supernormal profits enabled by market barriers that keep competitors 
away, unless appropriate structural reforms are undertaken to drastically reduce these 
barriers. Meanwhile, it seems that a different form of business is needed, a non-loss, non-
dividend company or social business. 
 
Social businesses are, however, difficult to theorise within the limits of Pareto optimality 
because of the so-called normative indeterminateness of efficiency. This prevents the 
consideration of a state of affairs that departs from the status quo in a more equitable 
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fashion, such as a business ecosystem in which hybrid firms like social businesses improve 
on the limited offerings available to the worst-off people in society. This article did not 
intend to outline a clear-cut alternative to Pareto optimality but rather to present some of the 
building blocks of the new economic rationale behind the social business model. In doing so, 
we have reached the conclusion that, despite their limits, there remain neoclassical 
contributions that offer a solid basis for researching social businesses. Thus, these can be 
understood and modelled as companies maximising value devolution. 
 
The future of this research agenda is challenging because of its multifaceted and 
multidisciplinary nature. The body of thought of both economics and management can be 
revisited to see what tools and discoveries achieved in the context of pure for-profits might 
be adapted to serve a social business’s aim and which ones might need to be created anew. 
Some of the critiques of social businesses sketched in the introduction are of value for 
understanding where future research on social business should head. 
 
Following Garrette and Karnani (2010), for instance, a better understanding of sources of 
revenues and strategies to scale up will be critical for the future of social businesses. If social 
businesses rely only on capital self-generated out of retained surpluses that are reinvested in 
the company – sometimes called institutional capital – the number and size of social 
businesses are likely to remain small. Dees and Anderson (2003) also warn against this 
practice, arguing that it compromises profits. How capital accrual for social businesses can 
be increased without scrapping the non-dividend constraint lies at the heart of this research 
agenda, which parallels questions related to the current debate on for-profit versus non-profit 
microfinance except that here the hybrid alternative of a social business is not considered 
(e.g. Morduch, 1999; Bhatt & Tang, 2001; Mersland & Strøm, 2008; Roberts, 2013). 
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Another key aspect for the future of social businesses concerns its corporate governance, as 
raised by Kickul et al. (2012). Although they do not touch on the problem of ensuring that a 
dividend-distributing company actually maximises profits, profit maximisation cannot 
simply be taken for granted when there is separation of ownership and control. Ensuring that 
managers are controlling a company to the full satisfaction of shareowners is extremely 
challenging and, contrary to what Kickul et al. (2012) suggest, the participation of managers 
in company profits is far from being the ultimate solution (e.g. Reinhardt, 2009). Indeed, the 
absence of profit distribution in social businesses could be seen as a governance mechanism 
that insures the worst-off customers against an abusive use of market power. Thus, the point 
may rather be how to guarantee that a social business is maximising value devolution given 
possible temptations to diverge from this aim, which connects with the issue of commercial 
non-profits’ organisational dynamics when a non-distribution constraint is enforced (e.g. 
Steinberg & Gray, 1993; Hansmann, 2003; Ortmann & Schlesinger, 2003). 
 
Last but not least, despite the need to dispense with Pareto optimality in order to advance a 
research agenda related to hybrid firm ecosystems, it is necessary to research possible new 
equilibria arising out of social businesses departing from the maximisation of value capture 
on a financially sustainable basis. What is the likely impact on income distribution of a 
growing number of social businesses competing with dividend-distributing companies in a 
hybrid firm ecosystem? How can social businesses contribute to fostering inclusive 
economic growth? Is there any future for social businesses in high-income economies or are 
they limited to low-income developing economies? (Let us remember that the EU’s Social 
Business Initiative is promoting the creation of social businesses in Europe.) What are the 
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implications for innovation and technological progress in a hybrid firm ecosystem? Is the 




Agafonow, A. (2014a). Toward a positive theory of social entrepreneurship. On maximizing 
versus satisficing value capture. Journal of Business Ethics, 125, 709-713. 
Agafonow, A. (2014b). Value Creation, Value Capture and Value Devolution. Where Do 
Social Enterprises Stand? Administration & Society, 1-23. DOI: 
10.1177/0095399714555756 
Agafonow, A. (2013). The Puzzled Regulator: The Missing Link in Our Understanding of 
Social Enterprises. Think piece series of UNRISD’s project Potential and Limits of 
Social and Solidarity Economy. Retrieved from 
http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/newsview.nsf/%28httpNews%29/C4C000A86D
FA6DF7C1257B8F0029EBC8?OpenDocument 
Akula, V. (2008). Business Basics at the Base of the Pyramid. Harvard Business Review, 86, 
53–57. 
Bhatt, N. & Tang, S.Y (2001). Delivering Microfinance in Developing Countries: 
Controversies and Policy Perspectives. Policy Studies Journal, 29, 319–333. 
Baumol, W.J., Litan, R.E., & Schramm, C.J. (2007). Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, and 
the Economics of Growth and Prosperity. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Boland, L.A. (1992). The Principles of Economics. Somes Lies My Teachers Told Me. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Dees, J. G. & Anderson, B. B. (2003). For-profit Social Ventures. International Journal of 
Entrepreneurship Education, 2, 1–26. 
Agafonow, A., & Donaldson, C. 2015. The Economic Rationale Behind the Social Business Model: A 




Donaldson, C, Baker, R., Cheater, F., Gillespie, M., McHugh, N., & Sinclair, S. (2011). 
Social business, health and well-being. Social Business, 1, 17–35. 
Enke, S. (1945). Consumer coöperatives and economic efficiency. The American Economic 
Review, 35, 148–155. 
Fitch, B. & Sorensen, L. (2007). The Case for Accelerating Profit-Making at the Base of the 
Pyramid: What could and Should the Donor Community Be Seeking to Do, and What 
Results Should It Expect. Journal of International Development, 19, 781–792. 
Garrette, B. & Karnai, A. (2010). Challenges in Marketing Socially Useful Goods to the 
Poor. California Management Review, 52, 29–47. 
Haber, S. (Ed.) (2002). Crony Capitalism and Economic Growth in Latin America. Theory 
and Evidence. USA: The Hoover Institution Press. 
Hahn, R. (2008). The Ethical Rational of Business for the Poor – Integrating the Concepts 
Bottom of the Pyramid, Sustainable Development, and Corporate Citizenship. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 84, 313–324. 
Hansmann, H. (2003). The Role of Trust in Nonprofit Enterprise. In H. Anheier & A. Ben-
Ner (Eds.). The Study of the Nonprofit Enterprise. Theories and Approaches (115-
122). New York: Kluwer Academic / Plenum Publishers. 
James, E. & Rose-Ackerman, S. (2013). The Nonprofit Enterprise in Market Economics. 
London and New York: Harwood Academic Publisher and Routledge. 
Kickul, J., Terjesen, S., Bacq, S. & Griffiths, M. (2012). Social Business Education: An 
Interview with Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus. Academy of Management Learning 
& Education, 11, 453–462. 
Kistruck, G.M., Sutter, C.J., Lount, R.B. & Smith, B.R. (2013). Mitigating Principal-Agent 
Problems in Base-of-the-Pyramid Markets: An Identity Spillover Perspective. 
Academy of Management Journal, 56, 659–682. 
Agafonow, A., & Donaldson, C. 2015. The Economic Rationale Behind the Social Business Model: A 




Mersland, R. & Strøm, R.Ø. (2008). Performance and Trade-Offs in Microfinance 
Organisations–Does Ownership Matter? Journal of International Development, 20, 
598–612. 
Morduch, J. (1999). The Microfinance Promise. Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 1569–
1614. 
Newhouse, J. P. (1970). Toward a theory of nonprofit institutions: An economic model of a 
hospital. The American Economic Review, 60, 64–74. 
Ortmann, A. & Schlesinger, M. (2003). Trust, Repute and the Role of Non-profit Enterprise. 
In H. Anheier & A. Ben-Ner (Eds.). The Study of the Nonprofit Enterprise. Theories 
and Approaches (77-114). New York: Kluwer Academic / Plenum Publishers. 
Pareto, V. (1971). Manual of Political Economy. New York: Augustus M. Kelley. 
Rangan, V., Chu, M. & Petkoski, D. (2011). Segmenting the Base of the Pyramid. Harvard 
Business Review, June, 113–17. 
Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Reinhardt, U. E. (2009, February 20). Whom Do Corporate Boards Represent? The New 
York Times. Retrieved from http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/20/whom-do-
corporate-boards-represent/ 
Roberts, P.W. (2013). The Profit Orientation of Microfinance Institutions and Effective 
Interest Rates. World Development, 41, 120–131. 
Santos, F. M. (2012). A Positive Theory of Social Entrepreneurship. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 111, 335–351. 
Seelos, C. & Mair, J. (2007). Profitable Business Models and Market Creation in the Context 
of Deep Poverty: A Strategic View. Academy of Management Perspectives, 21, 49–63. 
Agafonow, A., & Donaldson, C. 2015. The Economic Rationale Behind the Social Business Model: A 




Smith, A. (1904). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: 
Methuen & Co. 
Steinberg, R. & Gray, B.H (1993). “The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise” in 1993: Hansmann 
Revisited. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 22, 297–316. 
Townsend, H. (1995). Foundations of Business Economics. Markets and Prices. London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Webb, J.W., Kistruck, G.M., Ireland, R.D. & Ketchen, D.J. (2010). The Entrepreneurship 
Process in Base of the Pyramid Markets: The Case of Multinational 
Enterprise/Nongovernment Organization Alliances. Entrepreneurship Theory & 
Practice, 34, 555–581. 
Young, D.R. & Steinberg, R. (1995). Economics for Nonprofit Managers. United States of 
America: The Foundation Center. 
Yunus, M. (1998). Poverty Alleviation: Is Economics Any Help? Lessons from the Grameen 
Bank Experience. Journal of International Affairs, 52, 47–65. 
Yunus, M. (2007a). The Nobel Peace Prize 2006. Nobel Lecture. Law and Business Review 
of the Americas, 13, 267–275. 
Yunus, M. (2007b). Credit for the Poor. Poverty as Distant History. Harvard International 
Review, Fall, 20–24. 
Yunus, M., Moingeon, B. & Lehmann-Ortega, L. (2010). Building Social Business Models: 
Lessons from the Grameen Experience. Long Range Planning, 43, 308–325. 
Yunus, M. & Weber, K. (2007). Creating A World Without Poverty. Social Business and the 
Future of Capitalism. New York: Public Affairs. 
Yunus, M. & Weber, K. (2010). Building Social Business. The New Kind of Capitalism that 
Serves Humanity’s Most Pressing Needs. New York: Public Affairs. 
 
